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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, .; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
Karl Grant Losee, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. 
) Case No. 20080650-CA 
) Appeal 
) Oral Argument Requested 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District Court. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 78A-3-103(2)(e), and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to exclude 
evidence of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts, which led to his conviction 
for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, under rule 404(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence? The admission of evidence under Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion; however, "admission of prior crimes evidence itself 
must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper 
exercise of that discretion." State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 843 
(Utah 1999). 
II. Did the trial court incorrectly sentence Mr. Losee by failing to 
apply the Solicitation statute applicable to Mr. Losee at the time of 
his sentencing? In other words, because the Solicitation statute 
was amended after Mr. Losee was charged but before he was 
sentenced, was he entitled to be punished for a Second Degree 
Felony? Whether defendants are entitled to a lesser sentence when 
the legislature reduces the penalty for the crime charged before 
sentencing is a question of law. State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 138 
(Utah App. 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Art.l, Section 10. 
Utah Constitution, Art. 1, Section 18. 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-1-103. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-4-203. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-5-202. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from the final order and judgment of the Third 
District Court, the Honorable Terry L. Christiansen presiding. (Second 
Supplemental Index of Record (hereinafter, "Index of Record"), pp. 508-9.) 
Mr. Losee was charged November 13, 2006 by information with one 
count of Solicitation to Commit Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder, a 
First Degree Felony. (Index of Record, pp. 1-5.) An Amended Information 
with the same charge was filed December 19, 2006. (Index of Record, pp. 
241-43.) A Second Amended Information alleging the same charge was filed 
April 1, 2008. (Index of Record, pp. 361-63.) A Motion in Limine seeking to 
suppress evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crime was filed by Mr. Losee on 
March 14, 2007. (Index of Record, pp. 112-14.) The State filed a 
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Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine on June 1, 
2007. (Index of Record, pp. 168-89 and 517-38.) Mr. Losee's Reply to 
State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine was 
filed June 15, 2007. (Index of Record, pp. 190-96.) Judge Christiansen filed 
on July 31, 2007, a Memorandum Decision regarding the evidentiary issues 
raised in the Motion in Limine. (Index of Record, pp. 205-12.) 
A four-day jury trial was held April 1, 2008 through April 4, 2008. 
(Index of Record, pp. 413-14, 433-35, 439-40, and 441-42.) The jury found 
Mr. Losee guilty of Solicitation to Commit Homicide, Aggravated Murder. 
(Index of Record, p. 576; and Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, page 66, lines 4-6.) 
On July 15, 2008, Mr. Losee was sentenced to five years to life in prison, to 
run consecutively to the five years to life sentence he was already serving. 
(Index of Record, p. 571; and Sentencing Transcript, page 39, lines 12-15.) 
A timely notice of appeal was filed July 16, 2008. (Index of Record, 
p. 511-12.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Oral argument was held June 21, 2007 regarding Mr. Losee's Motion 
in Limine seeking to exclude evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes. (Index 
of Record, p. 572.) The trial court took the matter under advisement and 
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eventually filed a written Memorandum Decision allowing the admission of 
the evidence Mr. Losee sought to exclude. (Index of Record, pp. 205-212.) 
At trial, defendant's counsel renewed his objection to evidence of Mr. 
Losee's prior crimes. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 15, lines 9-21.) 
Because this evidence was ruled admissible, the State spent some time 
in its opening argument going into the details of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts 
and related crimes, telling the jury that during a prior incident on May 9, 
2006, Mr. Losee fired "at least 14 rounds from his firearm into [Becky 
Underwood's] door." (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 18-19, lines 14-14.) The 
jury also was told Mr. Losee held Ms, Underwood "hostage and at gunpoint 
for over an hour." (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 19, line 15.) During opening 
argument, the jury also was shown a photograph of the bullet holes left in 
the door to Ms. Underwood's apartment as a result of Mr. Losee's prior 
criminal acts. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 19-20, lines 23-1.) 
During the trial, the jury was presented with detailed evidence 
regarding Mr. Losee's prior bad acts of May 9, 2006. The jury heard Ms. 
Underwood describe that May 9, 2006 episode. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 
18, beginning at line 8.) The jury also listened to portions of the harrowing 
9-1-1 call made by Ms. Underwood during Mr. Losee's crime on May 9, 
2006. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 26-28.) 
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Ms. Underwood told the jury that on May 9, 2006 she invited to her 
home a man named Ryan Crocker. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 23, lines 14-
20.) Mr. Losee, who Ms. Underwood said fancied himself as her boyfriend, 
showed up during dinner, uninvited. Ms. Underwood invited Mr. Losee into 
her home. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 21, line 20 and pp. 23-24, lines 25-4.) 
According to Ms. Underwood, Mr. Losee got upset sometime after he 
"drank a couple of wine coolers and his whole demeanor changed." So, she 
asked him to leave. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 24, lines 12-17.) Eventually, 
Ms. Underwood decided to go to bed. "Next thing I heard was gunshots 
through my front door." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 25, lines 8-11.) Portions 
of the audiotape of Ms. Underwood's 9-1-1 call were played for the jury. 
(Trial transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 26-28.) On these tapes, the jury heard Ms. 
Underwood talking to the 9-1-1 operator. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 26, 
lines 20-22.) On the recording, a terrified Ms. Underwood tells the operator, 
"I've got somebody breaking into my front door." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, 
p. 2, lines 5-6.) An angry male voice, not identified at this point, but 
presumably Mr. Losee, is heard to say, "You're a fucking whore." 
(Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 2, line 20.) Ms. Underwood exclaims, "He's got 
a loaded gun." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 2, line 24.) The male voice can 
be heard responding, "I'm going to fucking kill you. ... You'd better bring a 
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fucking army because she's going down." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 3, 
lines 1-2.) Later, Ms. Underwood exclaims, "He's got a gun that he's 
shooting with." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 3, lines 20-21.) The male voice 
again, "You're going to die." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 4, line 17.) Ms. 
Underwood identifies the male speaker as Karl Losee. (Transcript of 9-1-1 
Call, pp. 4-5, lines 24-4.) Ms. Underwood later exclaims, "He's pointing the 
fucking gun at me." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 5, lines 12-13.) The 
operator asks, "Is he threatening to kill officers and you?" Ms. Underwood 
answers, "Just me right now, and my other friend that's here." (Transcript of 
9-1-1 Call, p. 6, lines 14-17.) Male voice: "If they come in the door they're 
going to fucking die." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 7, lines 2-3.) Male voice 
to Ms. Underwood: "I'm shooting through you too. ... You're going to die." 
(Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 7, lines 12-16.) Male voice, again: "You're 
going to fucking die." Ms. Underwood, "What did I do?" Male voice, "You 
screwed a fucking guy. You're a fucking cunt." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 
8, lines 17-24.) Later still, a scared Ms. Underwood tells the operator, Mr. 
Losee is "[h]ere with me with a gun pointed right here at me." (Transcript of 
9-1-1 Call, p. 11, lines 15-17.) Male speaker: "Don't tell me what I will and 
will not do. You whining motherfucker. I'm going to shoot you in the back." 
(Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 12, lines 21-22.) 
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After listening to the 9-1-1 tape with the jury, Ms. Underwood 
continued testifying about the May 9, 2006 incident. She told the jury that 
Mr. Losee fired his gun "directly above my head. ... There were powder 
burns all over my face." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 29, lines 15-19.) 
At trial, Andre Pendleton testified that Mr. Losee asked him to 
arrange for Ms. Underwood's murder. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 68, lines 2-
5.) This solicitation allegedly occurred sometime in the fall of 2006. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 59-60, lines 25-1.) Mr. Pendleton testified that a 
message was to be delivered to Ms. Underwood when she was killed: "You 
shouldn't have fucked over the little man." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 71, 
lines 16-19.) Mr. Pendleton also testified he heard Mr. Losee use this 
jailhouse nickname to refer to himself. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 71, lines 
22-25.) Mr. Pendleton also testified he received a map from Mr. Losee, 
with directions to Ms. Underwood's house. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p.67, 
lines 14-15.) 
On July 15, 2008, based on his first degree felony conviction in this 
case, Mr. Losee was sentenced to five years to life in prison, to run 
consecutively to the five years to life sentence he was already serving. 
(Index of Record, p. 571; and Sentencing Transcript, page 39, lines 12-15.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of prior 
bad acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show he acted 
in conformity with that character. Sometimes, evidence of prior bad acts 
may be admissible for other purposes, but only if that evidence is relevant to 
the case at hand, and only if the probative value of that evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudice to the defendant. Thus, under rule 
404(b), evidence of prior bad acts cannot be admitted unless it can be shown 
such evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, is relevant 
under Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and is not overly 
prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In this case, graphic details of Mr. Losee's prior crimes of aggravated 
burglary and aggravated assault were improperly allowed by the trial court. 
The evidence was not of a proper, noncharacter kind, was not relevant to the 
case at hand, and was substantially more prejudicial to the defendant than it 
was probative of any element of the crime being adjudicated. The highly 
inflammatory evidence regarding Mr. Losee's prior crimes robbed Mr. 
Losee of a fair trial. It was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to allow 
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this evidence, and without such evidence, it is likely Mr. Losee would not 
have been convicted. 
Secondly, because the aggravated murder statute was amended after 
the occurrence of Mr. Losee's alleged solicitation for the murder of Ms. 
Underwood, but before he was sentenced, he is entitled to be punished under 
the new penalty as a result of that amendment. Because the amendment 
changed the penalty for Mr. Losee's alleged solicitation from a first degree 
felony to a second degree felony, Mr. Losee is entitled to be punished under 
the terms of a second degree felony. It makes no difference that the 
solicitation statute was later amended, after Mr. Losee's trial but before his 
sentencing, to re-classify Mr. Losee's crime as a first degree felony, because 
application of such an ex post facto law is barred by the constitutions of the 
United States and the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE OF MR. LOSEE'S EARLIER CRIMES 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED BECAUSE SUCH 
EVIDENCE WAS NOT OFFERED FOR A PROPER, 
NONCHARACTER PURPOSE, WAS NOT RELEVANT TO 
THE CASE AT HAND, AND WAS UNFAIRLY 
PREJUDICIAL TO MR. LOSEE. 
Details of Mr. Losee's prior crimes is exactly the kind of 
overwhelmingly unfair evidence the rules of evidence seek to exclude from a 
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jury's attention, because it is the kind of evidence that "tends to skew and 
corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 
291, 295 (Utah 1988). 
Such evidence, according to Dean Wigmore, "is objectionable not 
because it has no appreciable probative value but because it has too much." 
Id- (Citing, with approval, 1A J. Wigmore, "Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law," Section 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983).) 
An "abuse of discretion" standard of review applies to evidentiary 
rulings under rule 404(b). Decorso, at 843. However, "admission of prior 
crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the 
proper exercise of that discretion." Id. 
Because Mr. Losee's prior crimes were so spectacularly horrifying, 
the facts surrounding those crimes could do nothing but skew and corrupt 
the jury's efforts in the trial below. 
Whether evidence of prior bad acts is admissible is subject to rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The rule provides, in relevant part: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
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When analyzing whether particular evidence is admissible under rule 
404(b), a court must undertake a three-part analysis. First, the court must 
determine whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter 
purpose. Second, the court must determine whether such evidence is 
relevant (under Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence). Finally, 
the court must determine whether the evidence should be excluded because 
it is more prejudicial than probative (Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence). State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 843 (Utah 1999). See also, State 
v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988); State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 
(Utah 1989); and State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139 (Utah App. 2002). 
a. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes was not offered for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose. 
"If the court determines that the evidence is being offered only to 
show the defendant's propensity to commit crime, then it is inadmissible and 
must be excluded." Id. 
The trial court's analysis in this case is off the mark in finding that 
evidence of Mr. Losee's previous crime is admissible for the noncharacter 
purpose of motive. At first blush, the trial court's reasoning seems 
persuasive. (But see, State v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah App. 2001), 
wherein the court applied the reasoning of Decorso to the State's claimed 
need for prior crimes evidence to show defendant's identity and intent. The 
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Webster court found the State's claims wanting, and concluded that the 
admission of prior crimes evidence was harmful error, in part because the 
court had not engaged in a scrupulous examination of the prior crimes 
evidence before allowing it into evidence.) 
Here, the trial court found Mr. Losee's prior acts were fueled by his 
alleged animosity and emotion toward Ms. Underwood. The trial court also 
found that Mr. Losee's extreme emotion was still lingering by the time Mr. 
Losee allegedly solicited Ms. Underwood's murder some five months later. 
The trial court then ruled that Mr. Losee's prior bad acts "establish this 
emotional motive in a way no other evidence available to the State can." 
Memorandum Decision, pp. 4-5. 
The trial court's own findings undermine its assertion the State had no 
other evidence regarding Mr. Losee's "emotional motive." The trial court 
presumed the testimony of Andre Pendleton, noting, "Defendant's parting 
message to Ms. Underwood - the last thing that Defendant wanted her to 
hear, [sic] was an emotionally-charged statement through which she would 
know who had killed her." Memorandum Decision at 5-6. This statement -
that, according to Mr. Pendleton, Ms. Underwood was to be told, "you 
shouldn't have fucked over the little man" — certainly can convey an 
emotional motive without the concurrent he's-a-bad-guy-who-already-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
kidnapped-and-assaulted-Ms. Underwood-with-a-gun undertones of the 
prior bad acts evidence. 
Furthermore, to focus on Mr. Losee's emotional state during the 
commission of his prior crimes is to miss the point. As the Featherson court 
noted, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the other acts have 'clearly 
probative value with respect to the intent of the accused at the time of the 
offense charged?" Id. at 429-30 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). 
The Featherson court was discussing the issue of remoteness in time from 
the prior crime to the crime at issue in trial, but its point is equally relevant 
here. The statements allegedly made by Mr. Losee to Mr. Pendleton are 
much more relevant to Mr. Losee's state of mind at the time of the alleged 
solicitation for which he was being tried in this matter than are his state of 
mind and actions of May, 2006. 
It is simply error to assign a proper, noncharacter motive to admission 
of evidence Mr. Losee's prior crimes. 
b. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts is simply not relevant to 
the case at trial. 
"[U]nless the other crimes evidence tends to prove some fact that is 
material to the crime charged - other than the defendant's propensity to 
commit crime - it is irrelevant and should be excluded by the court pursuant 
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to rule 402." Decorso, at 844. See also Featherson, at 426 (facts regarding 
prior crimes "must be material to the crime charged" before they are 
admissible). 
" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. And, "[a]ll relevant 
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these 
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible." Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Mr. Losee was on trial for his alleged solicitation of Ms. Underwood's 
murder sometime in the fall of 2006, not his admitted aggravated burglary 
and aggravated assault which occurred in May, 2006. The earlier events 
have no bearing on the State's proof of the elements of the solicitation of 
murder charge. To be guilty of solicitation, a defendant must (1) intend that 
a felony be committed when he (2) solicits, requests, commands, offers to 
hire, or importunes another (3) to engage in specific conduct the defendant 
believes would be a felony. Utah Code Ann. 76-4-203(1) (1993). 
Furthermore, the solicitation must be "made under circumstances strongly 
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corroborative of the [defendant's] intent that the offense be committed. Utah 
Code Ann. 76-4-203(2) (1993). 
The events of May, 2006 simply have no bearing on Mr. Losee's 
intent at the time he allegedly solicited Ms. Underwood's murder some five 
months later. Mr. Losee's earlier crimes do not have any bearing on the 
specific conduct sought by Mr. Losee when he sat in jail during the fall of 
2006, and they can shed no light on whether or not he believed he was 
asking Mr. Pendleton commit a felony. Thus, the facts surrounding Mr. 
Losee's prior crimes of May, 2006 are not relevant, and are not admissible 
under rule 402. 
c. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts is prejudicial, and 
substantially outweighs any probative value to the State's 
solicitation case. 
Evidence of prior crimes is not admissible if it is "substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury." Decorso, at 844. Furthermore, 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of 
matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as 
to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree 
to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Id., quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (emphasis 
supplied). 
It is undeniable that the evidence is strong regarding Mr. Losee's prior 
bad acts of May, 2006. Mr. Losee pleaded guilty to crimes of aggravated 
burglary and aggravated assault. Some of his most outrageous behavior was 
recorded in the 9-1-1 call made by Ms. Underwood. His behavior was 
witnessed by police. However, under the analysis of both Shickles and 
Bradley (which follows Shickles), even where there is strong proof of the 
prior crime, prior crimes evidence also must be strongly probative of the 
defendant's intent to commit the latter crime which is the subject at trial. 
Here, evidence of Mr. Losee's prior aggravated burglary and aggravated 
assault is not probative of his intent to commit the charged crime of 
solicitation of murder. Without such a connection, evidence of his prior 
crimes is inadmissible. (See, discussion of Shickles factors four and five, 
below.) 
Furthermore, this factor is but one of six. When all the factors are 
looked at scrupulously, it becomes obvious the evidence of Mr. Losee's 
prior bad acts should have been excluded. Additionally, the trial court only 
seems to have looked closely at this factor and the second factor regarding 
similarities between the prior crimes and his crime. And, the trial court got 
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its analysis of the second factor wrong, assessing "commonality" instead of 
the similarities between the two criminal episodes. 
Mr. Losee's prior crimes and the crime at trial are dissimilar as two 
crimes can be. It is not enough to conclude, as the trial court did, "that these 
separate crimes were perpetrated against the same victim, for arguably a 
common reason and outcome[, thus] completing] the commonality 
element." Memorandum Decision at 7. In Decorso the similarity relied on 
was the court's earlier finding that the prior crime and the instant crime were 
so alike as to be "signature-like." Id. at 845. In Bradley, the court found "a 
significant similarity between" the prior sex abuse crimes against a different 
victim, who was a sibling to the victims in the instant trial, and "those 
perpetrated against" those sibling victims. Id. at 1147. That finding was 
based upon the defendant's use of "a similar methodology and plan" in 
abusing both prior and current victims. Id. 
As these cases make clear, to support admission of prior bad acts, the 
instant crime and the prior bad acts must be so strikingly similar in nature 
that evidence of the former is evidence of the latter. There is simply no such 
similarity between Mr. Losee's prior acts and the actions which led to the 
charge of solicitation against him. 
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The prior crime was a crime of extreme emotion, occurring in an 
impassioned and drunken state without any clearheaded forethought. There 
most certainly was not any of the deliberate and calculating effort to commit 
a murder that is the hallmark of solicitation. Solicitation regards a business-
like, contractual arrangement which requires much thought and planning 
before it can be consummated. 
Third, the interval of time elapsed between Mr. Losee's dissimilar 
criminal episodes - the prior crimes aggravated burglary and aggravated 
assault and the alleged solicitation of murder at issue in this trial -
minimizes the probative value of the evidence. The five months that elapsed 
between Mr. Losee's violent, frightening May, 2006 outburst and the alleged 
quiet, business-like solicitation of September sap the former of any 
reasonable relationship to the latter. As already noted above, the Featherson 
court weighed in on this very issue: "Remoteness refers to the time between 
the prior crime and the offense for which the accused is on trial, but the test 
for remoteness is not a mechanical application. The relevant inquiry is 
whether the other acts have 'clearly probative value with respect to the intent 
of the accused at the time of the offense charged.'" Id. at 430 (emphasis in 
original). Thus, it doesn't matter so much how much time has passed, as 
how that time has passed. 
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As noted by the Bradley court, "proximity in time [combined with] 
similarity" to the prior bad acts make evidence of the prior acts "highly 
probative." Id. at 1147. Here, no such link exists. Time has severed almost 
completely the prior crimes from the charged crime. There is no common 
scheme between the prior crimes and the charged crime; there are precious 
few common facts between the prior crime and the charged crime (the key 
victim is the same); there is no relationship between the alleged motives 
(drunken jealousy vs. revenge); the intent is different (angrily and 
emotionally terrorizing a victim he "loves" vs. killing a victim with whom 
Mr. Losee's relationship has been severed); one is a crime of opportunity 
(have scooter and gun, will travel), while the other is a crime of preparation 
and planning (hence, the alleged drawing of a map to help a hired killer find 
the victim). 
Fourth, the prosecution did not need the evidence of Mr. Losee's prior 
crimes to try to prove the solicitation charge. Where "[t]here was sufficient 
evidentiary proof to show that all the elements of the charged crimes had 
been satisfied[,] [introduction of all prior misconduct and convictions was 
unnecessary." Featherson at 431. 
Here, the State could show sufficient facts to make out the elements of 
the charged crime of solicitation of murder. Mr. Pendleton provided 
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testimony regarding Mr. Losee's intent that Ms. Underwood be murdered. 
Mr. Pendleton also provided testimony that Mr. Losee solicited him to kill 
Ms. Underwood, or find somebody else to hire to kill her. Mr. Pendleton's 
testimony could be used by the State to show the solicitation of Ms. 
Underwood's murder was made under circumstances strongly corroborative 
of Mr. Losee's intent the murder actually be consummated. The map Mr. 
Pendleton produced also supports the State's case on the elements of 
solicitation. 
Fifth, the court is required to look into the efficacy of the alternative 
proof. As discussed above, the alternative proof available to the State is 
enough to make out the elements of the case. The trial court failed to 
explore the State's need for prior crimes evidence, or the efficacy of that 
alternative evidence to the State's case. This failure to address the issue of 
alternative evidence is, accordingly, a failure to meet its mandate to 
"scrupulously examine" the admissibility of prior crimes evidence. 
Further, the requirement that the availability and efficacy of 
alternative evidence be explored by the trial court when assessing the 
admissibility of prior crimes evidence cannot mean the State is entitled to 
that evidence simply because it doesn't have a good case without it. That 
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would make the prohibition of unfairly prejudicial evidence a barren 
prohibition at best. 
There is alternative proof in the solicitation case against Mr. Losee. 
The State may have been unsure of its alternative proof against Mr. Losee 
because, after all, its evidence comes primarily from a pair of jailhouse 
snitches who had much to gain, earning better deals regarding their own 
crimes for their testimony against Mr. Losee. But any perceived weaknesses 
in the State's solicitation case against Mr. Losee should not allow the State 
to essentially retry him for the prior crime. This is exactly the kind of 
intermingling of prior and instant case that "tends to skew and corrupt the 
accuracy of the fact-finding process." Shickles, supra. 
Under the final Decorso factor, the trial court was to have explored 
the degree to which evidence of Mr. Loseefs prior acts would "rouse the jury 
to overmastering hostility" toward Mr. Losee. The court failed to 
scrupulously explore this issue, superficially noting that while Mr. Losee's 
actions of May, 2006 "were undeniably extreme ... these acts were no less 
extreme than the actions which led to the charge of Solicitation to Commit 
Aggravated Murder." Memorandum Decision, at 7. 
To deny the prejudicial effect of Mr. Losee's criminal acts of May, 
2006, is to look at those actions while wearing blinders. State v. Mauren 770 
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P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), is instructive regarding the prejudicial effect of 
evidence likely to create an emotional response in the jury. 
In that case, the defendant, who was charged with murder, wrote a 
callous, profane letter to the victim's father 38 days after the murder. The 
court noted, "because of its shocking display of lack of remorse by 
defendant and repulsiveness of expressions toward the victim and her father, 
the balance of the letter may well have been highly inflammatory in the eyes 
of the jury." Id. at 983. The court ruled that a large portion of the letter 
should not have been admitted under rule 403, noting that the inadmissible 
parts of the letter "contained little or no relevance to the central issue and 
that any relevance ... was clearly outweighed by the danger of 'unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, [and] misleading the jury.' ... 
[A]dmission of the entire letter was clearly erroneous." Id. The court 
explained later in the decision: "the principle issue for the jury to determine 
was his state of mind at the time of the killing. The State had several 
witnesses to establish that. ... The balance of the letter, which expresses 
defendant's vindictiveness and complete lack of remorse, reflected little or 
nothing on his state of mind at the time of the killing" Id. at 986 (emphasis 
supplied). In reversing the defendant's conviction, and remanding for a new 
trial, the Maurer court noted the letter was addressed by the prosecution in 
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its opening and closing arguments, and concluded: "These remarks, together 
with the letter, clearly could have provoked an emotional response from the 
jury and provoked its instinct to punish or otherwise divert the jury from its 
task to determine the mental state of defendant at the time of the killing." Id. 
at 987. 
The same may be said of the instant case, wherein Mr. Losee's 
frightening actions of May, 2006 reflected little or nothing on his state of 
mind at the time of his alleged solicitation for murder, and evidence of those 
actions of May, 2006 clearly could have provided an emotional response 
from the jury, provoking its instinct to punish or otherwise diverting the jury 
from the task of determining Mr. Losee's guilt on the solicitation charge. 
State v. Pendergrass, 586 P.2d 691 (Mont. 1978), cited with approval 
by the Maurer court, is also instructive. In that case, the harrowing 
audiotape of a rape victim's 9-1-1 call was admitted over defendant's 
objection. In ruling the admission of the tape was reversible error in 
violation of rule 403, the court explained: 
The tape was highly prejudicial to defendant. ... [I]t contained 
emotional and nearly incoherent outpourings of the victim in the 
immediate aftermath of a violent crime. These utterances necessarily 
induced a feeling of outrage against the defendant and sympathy for 
the victim. Undue prejudice against defendant was created and a fair 
trial climate was destroyed by this tape. 
Id. at 694. 
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Here, the trial court allowed the jury to hear, over Mr. Losee's 
objection, a portion of the highly emotional 9-1-1 call by Ms. Underwood 
not regarding the crime which the jury was to decide, but regarding Mr. 
Losee'sprior crimes. In other words, the 9-1-1 call played in the trial below 
was utterly lacking any of the relevance of the 9-1-1 tape played in 
Pendergrass, while carrying all of the emotional baggage which "necessarily 
induced" in the jury a feeling of outrage against Mr. Losee and sympathy for 
the victim. Such feelings surely prejudiced Mr. Losee and destroyed any 
hope he had of a fair trial climate. 
There is no question the prejudicial weight of Mr. Losee's prior 
crimes substantially outweighs the minimal probative value the evidence had 
to the solicitation charge against Mr. Losee. Because Mr. Losee's prior 
crimes were so dissimilar to the alleged solicitation in the instant case, 
because the interval between the prior crimes and the instant crime severed 
almost any connection between the two, because the State had available 
effective alternative proof, and because evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes 
was substantially more prejudicial than it was minimally probative of 
solicitation to commit murder, evidence of his prior crimes should not have 
been admitted. To admit this evidence was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. 
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II. EVEN IF THIS COURT UPHOLDS THE VERDICT 
REACHED BY THE JURY, MR. LOSEE IS ENTITLED TO 
THE LESSER PENALTY AFFORDED BY THE AMENDED 
AGGRAVATAED MURDER STATUTE BECAUSE THE 
AMENDMENT WAS MADE EFFECTIVE SUBSEQUENT 
TO MR. LOSEE'S COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE AND 
PRIOR TO HIS SENTENCING 
Because the legislature amended the aggravated murder statute after 
Mr. Losee's offense, but prior to his sentencing, Mr. Losee is entitled to the 
lesser penalty afforded by the amended statute. State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 
136, 138 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). Whether a defendant is 
entitled to a lesser sentence when the legislature reduces the penalty for the 
crime charged prior to sentencing presents a "question of law" which this 
court reviews "for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions." Id. 
Mr. Losee was charged November 13, 2006 by information with one 
count of Solicitation to Commit Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder, a 
First Degree Felony. The allegation remained the same when an Amended 
Information was filed December 19, 2006, and a Second Amended 
Information was filed April 1, 2008, on the first day of trial. 
The aggravated murder statute under which Mr. Losee was originally 
charged defined aggravated murder as a "capital felony." Utah Code Ann. 
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76-5-202(2) (2005). The criminal solicitation statute in effect at the time of 
Mr. Losee's alleged offense described the penalty to be applied to Mr. 
Losee's crime: "Criminal solicitation to commit... a capital felony is a first 
degree felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(1) (1990). The aggravated 
murder statute was amended in 2007. That amendment created two 
definitions of aggravated murder. Under the first definition, it remained a 
capital offense. Under the definition applicable to Mr. Losee's offense, 
aggravated murder became "a noncapital first degree felony." Utah Code 
Ann. 76-5-202(3)(a)&(b) (2007).1 Because of the amendment to the 
aggravated murder statute, Mr. Losee's crime became a first degree felony 
that was reclassified under the solicitation statute as "a first degree felony is 
a second degree felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(2) (1990). As a result of 
these amendments, which occurred before Mr. Losee was sentenced, Mr. 
Losee is entitled to be sentenced for a second degree felony, not the first 
degree felony under which he was sentenced. 
The relevant language of the amended statute is: (a) If a notice of intent to 
seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated murder is a capital felony, 
(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has not been filed, 
aggravated murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for life without parole or by an indeterminate term of not less 
than 20 years and which may be for life." No notice of intent to seek the 
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This remains true even though the criminal solicitation statute itself 
was amended and took effect after Mr. Losee's April, 2008 trial but before 
he was actually sentenced on July 15, 2008. Effective May 5, 2008, the 
criminal solicitation statute was amended, at least in part, to reflect the 
changed language of the aggravated murder statute. The new solicitation 
statute again reclassified Mr. Losee's crime: "Criminal solicitation to 
commit... a felony punishable by imprisonment for life without parole, is a 
first degree felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(1 )(a) (2008). 
However, this amendment to the criminal solicitation statute is 
inapplicable to Mr. Losee's case. Because application of the amended 
criminal solicitation statute to Mr. Losee's case would increase his 
punishment, it violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws found in 
the Utah and United States constitutions. U.S. Const. Art. 1, Section 10; and 
Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 18. 
"An ex post facto law is one that punishes as a crime an act previously 
committed, which ... makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, 
after its commission." State v. Norton, 675 P. 2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted). 
Finally, even though counsel did not raise this sentencing issue below, 
this Court can address the matter of Mr. Losee's sentencing because the 
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failure of the trial court to make the proper sentence under applicable law is 
plain error. "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may 
not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 10 P. 3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000). 
However, the plain error doctrine creates an exception to this general rule: 
The plain error exception enables an appellate court to 'balance the 
need for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.' 'At 
bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [an appellate court] 
to avoid injustice.' To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must 
establish that '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the [outcome] is 
undermined. 
Id. Under Utah's sentencing structure, the penalties for a first degree felony 
and a second degree felony differ substantially. The punishment for a first 
degree felony is an indeterminate sentence of five years to life in prison. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-203(1). The punishment for a second degree 
felony is an indeterminate sentence of one to 15 years in prison. Utah Code 
Ann. Section 76-3-203(2). It is clearly an injustice for Mr. Losee to be 
punished under the harsher first degree felony requirement simply because 
the trial court failed to notice a change in the statute applying to his case, 
and because counsel failed to remind the court of this change. Fairness 
demands that this Court order a correction to Mr. Losee's sentence to avoid 
such an injustice. 
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Failure to sentence Mr. Losee correctly is clearly an error. The change 
in the statute under which Mr. Losee was charged should have been obvious 
to the trial court, whose job it is to know and apply correctly the laws of the 
State of Utah. And, absent this error, it is highly likely the outcome for Mr. 
Losee would be more favorable: i.e., he would be sentenced to the shorter 
prison term. 
It was plain error for the trial not to sentence Mr. Losee correctly, and 
justice and fairness demand this Court should order he be so sentenced. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to 
reverse the jury's finding Appellant was guilty of First Degree Solicitation to 
Commit Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2011. 
Robert L. Donohoe 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM I 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Sec. 10. [Powers denied the states.] 
[1.] No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant 
letters of marque and reprisal: coin money; emit bills of credit; make any 
thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of 
attainder, as post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, or 
grant any title of nobility. 
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or 
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for 
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, 
laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of 
the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and 
Control of the Congress. 
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of 
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agree-
ments or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in 
War. unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit 
of delay. 
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ADDENDUM II 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing con-
tracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall be passed. 
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ADDENDUM III 
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Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissi-
ble; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as other-
wise provided by the Constitution of the United States 
or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by 
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of 
this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admis-
sible. 
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Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence. 
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to 
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. iUvidence or otlier 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, 
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76-1-103. Application of code — Offense prior 
to effective date. 
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the 
construction of, the punishment for, and defenses 
against any offense defined in this code or, except 
where otherwise specifically provided or the context 
otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this 
code; provided such offense was committed after the 
effective date of this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective 
date of this code shall be governed by the law, 
statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of 
commission thereof, except that a defense or limita-
tion on punishment available under this code shall 
be available to any defendant tried or retried after 
the effective date. An offense under the laws of this 
state shall be deemed to have been committed prior 
to the effective date of this act if any of the elements 
of the offense occurred prior thereto. 1973 
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76-3-203. Felony convict ion — Indeterminate 
term of imprisonment. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, 
unless the statute provides otherwise, for a 
term of not less than five years and which may 
be for life. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second 
degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, 
for a term of not less than one year nor more 
than 15 years. 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, 
unless the statute provides otherwise, for a 
term not to exceed five years. 2003 
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76-4-203. Criminal solicitation — Elements. 
(1) An actor commits criminal solicitation if with 
intent that a felony be committed, he solicits, re-
quests, commands, offers to hire, or importunes an-
other person to engage in specific conduct that under 
the circumstances as the actor believes them to be 
would be a felony or would cause the other person to 
be a party to the commission of a felony. 
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section 
only if the solicitation is made under circumstances 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent that the 
offense be committed. 
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the 
person solicited by the actor: 
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation; 
(b) does not commit an overt act: 
(c) does not engage in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward the commission of any 
offense; 
(d) is not criminally responsible for the felony 
solicited; 
(e) was acquitted, was not prosecuted or con-
victed, or was convicted of a different offense or of 
a different type or degree of offense; or 
(f) is immune from prosecution. 
(4) It is not a defense under this section that the 
actor: 
(a) belongs to a class of persons that by defini-
tion is legally incapable of committing the offense 
in an individual capacity; or 
(b) fails to communicate with the person he 
solicits to commit an offense, if the intent of the 
actor's conduct was to effect the communication. 
(5) Nothing in this section prevents an actor who 
otherwise solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense from being pros-
ecuted and convicted as a party to the offense under 
Section 76-2-202 if the person solicited actually com-
mits the offense. 1993 
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76-4-204. C r i m i n a l s o l i c i t a t i o n - P e n a l t i e s . 
Criminal s o l v a t i o n t o c o m r u i t 
(1) a c a p i t a l x e i o n ,
 r a f c t a e g x 
(2) ^ 
fe
 W Y a second degree felony i , a third degree 
" S S Y & d degree felony is a d a s s A n * d e 
meanor. 
76-4-204. Criminal solicitation — Penal t ies . 
(1) Criminal solicitation to commit: 
(a) a capital felony, or a felony punishable by imprisonment for life 
without parole, is a first degree felony; 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (l)(c) or (d), a first degree felony is 
a second degree felony; 
(c) any of the following offenses is a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not fewer than three years and 
wThich may be for life: 
(i) murder, Subsection 76-5-203(2)(a); 
(ii) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; or 
(hi) except as provided in Subsection (l)(d), any of the felonies 
described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Par t 4, Sexual Offenses, that are first 
degree felonies; 
(d) except as provided in Subsection (2), any of the following offenses is 
a first degree felony, punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than 
15 years and which may be for life: 
(i) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(ii) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; or 
(hi) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
(e) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; and 
(f) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (l)(d), a court finds tha t 
a lesser term than the te rm described in Subsection (l)(d) is in the interests of 
justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may 
impose a term of imprisonment of not less than: 
(a) ten years and which may be for life; 
(b) six years and which may be for life; or .;• 
(c) three years and which may be for life. 
History: C. 1953,- 76-4-204, enacted by L. felony punishable by imprisonment for life 
1990, ch. 189, § 2; 2008, ch. 179, § 2. without parole"; in (l)(b), added "except as 
Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amend- provided in Subsection (1X0 or (d)"; added 
ment, effective May 5, 2008, designated the (l)(c) and (l)(d); redesignated former (3) and (4) 
opening phrase as (1); redesignated former (1) as (l)(e) and (l)(f); and added (2). 
and (2) as (l)(a) and (l)(b); in (l)(a), added "or a 
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76.5-202. Aggravated m u r d e r 
d e ^ i f t i j ^ r 1 n ° m ] C l d f e i n s t i t u t e s a « ~ a v « w 
Y t n e a c tor mtentionallv
 n- l 'T0*:^ a tec mur-death of another
 U n d l r a m - ^ J f ° ^ n g i y c a u s e ^ th« 
stances: U C L r **> <* the following
 C l r c u ^ 
g ) Aggravated murder is a capital f e W . 
2005 
76-5-202. Aggravated murde r . 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated mur-
der if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
r ,-up followmg circum-
death of another under anv of .he 
stances: 
'3) (a) If a notice of intent to seek the death pen-
alty has been filed, aggravated murder is a capi-
tal felony 
(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty has not been filed, aggravated murder is 
a noncapital first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for life without parole or by an 
indeterminate term of not less than 20 years and 
which may be for life. 
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